

HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR

BASED ON OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

MILITARY OPERATIONS TOGOLAND AND THE CAMEROONS

1914—1916

COMPILED, BY ARRANGEMENT WITH THE COLONIAL OFFICE, UNDER
THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE

BY

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CHAPTER I

INCEPTION OF THE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE GERMAN POSSESSIONS IN WEST AFRICA, AND THE CAPTURE OF TOGOLAND

(Frontispiece map and Map 1.)

At the outbreak of war, the large navy and the small regular army, which Great Britain had deliberately adopted as the scale of her first line of national defence, were more completely prepared for war and readier for action than at any earlier period of her history. It is true that for the long-drawn-out struggle in Belgium and France and for the major offensive operations undertaken elsewhere our preparations for war proved to be totally inadequate. But, for the security of our overseas Empire the measures of defence proved sufficient; and the integrity of our dominions, colonies and protectorates was scarcely ever in doubt. Relieved of serious anxiety regarding their own security, their British peoples were thus free to devote greater efforts to that organisation of their physical, material and intellectual resources which was to contribute much to the final Allied success.

It had for many years been accepted that the defence of the British overseas territories against serious attack could be generally assured by a navy of sufficient strength, based on fortified coaling stations held by Imperial troops and supported by local forces. The organisation and strength of the latter had been a matter of discussion by the series of committees, commissions and conferences, which ever since the time of the Crimea and the Indian Mutiny had considered periodically the question of Imperial defence; and after the South African war the participation in these conferences by representatives of the self-governing Dominions had resulted in their accepting responsibility for their own local defence. In 1911 it had finally been agreed that an Imperial General Staff should be formed to ensure a uniform military doctrine throughout the Empire, and that in each territory forces should be maintained

sufficient for self-defence, all organised, trained and equipped on the same lines. But although it was confidently anticipated that in an emergency substantial help would be forthcoming from the Dominions, no pressure had been brought on them to define its form and extent.

Thus when war broke out, though no one could say what forces would be available for any enterprise, there were local forces in every portion of the Empire, each with its own defence scheme prepared to meet local requirements. These schemes legislated primarily for a defensive attitude, though generally, where foreign territory adjoined, projects of offensive operations had been outlined, with the proviso that they were only to be undertaken with the full knowledge and approval of H.M. Government or, in the event of communication with England being cut, when the safety of H.M.'s possessions could not otherwise be secured.

It was certain that these arrangements would not suffice to meet the case of war with Germany. For one thing, this would inevitably mean a conflict for the command of the sea, in which, as always in the past, the navy would look to the army for assistance in capturing points on land whose occupation by the enemy menaced the security of the main sea-routes.

Formation of a Committee to consider operations in foreign territory.

It was in these circumstances that, on the 5th August 1914, H.M. Government approved the formation in London of a joint naval and military committee for the consideration of combined naval and military operations in foreign territory. The Committee were instructed that their object was to decide what objectives could be assigned to joint expeditions with a view to producing a definite effect on the result of the war. Having decided on the broad lines of any joint operations, they were to submit their proposals to the Cabinet, and, in the case of those approved, were to work out the details as far as might be necessary.

This Committee, termed the Offensive Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, and composed of representatives of the Admiralty and the War, Foreign, Colonial and India Offices, assembled the same day with Admiral Sir Henry Jackson in the Chair, and with Brigadier-General C. M. Dobell, Inspector-General of the West African Frontier Force among its members.* At this period, owing to the naval

* Till the Committee ceased their work in November 1914, the members who attended most of the meetings were Admiral Jackson, Sir George Fiddes (Colonial Office), Major-General C. E. Callwell (War Office), Colonel Sir G. Aston (Admiralty), and the Secretary, Major S. H. Wilson.

dispositions arranged with the French and to the necessity for concentrating our main naval strength in Scottish waters, the great trade sea-routes were but slenderly protected. This was the more serious since Germany had cruisers abroad and was credited with the intention of arming a large number of fast and powerful liners as commerce destroyers wherever they might happen to be at the outbreak of war. On the 27th July the Admiralty had telegraphed to all foreign stations that, as the European political situation rendered war not impossible, preparations were to be made, as unobtrusively as possible, to shadow ships of the Central Powers and to take other measures of a precautionary nature; two days later, the Admiralty and the War and Colonial Offices had issued their pre-arranged "warning" telegrams for bringing into force the precautionary stage of mobilisation; on the 4th August the Grand Fleet had started to sweep north so as to intercept German commerce destroyers which it was reported were trying to break out of German ports; and on the 5th the five German cables which passed through the English Channel to Vigo, Tenerife and the Azores were cut. The result of these measures, however, still remained to be seen.

As regards the proceedings of the Offensive Sub-Committee, Sir Julian Corbett says in his "Naval Operations": * "At the outset of its deliberations the Committee recognised the principle that no force must be dissipated on enterprises which would prejudice the Imperial concentration in the main theatre and the safety of the great trade routes, and further that all expeditions for the conquest of distant territory were faulty in conception unless and until we had established a working command of the sea in all quarters. This being so, no objective would be legitimate which could not be dealt with by local forces, and no such objective could have a definite effect on the course of the war unless it tended to confirm our hold upon sea communications. As long as the enterprises were kept within these lines, so far from dissipating force, they would tend to assist and strengthen the main concentration of effort by keeping open the flow of trade and the Imperial lines of passage and communication. Unless this was done effectively a free concentration of effort in the main theatre was impossible.

"The objectives within these limitations were not far to seek. They must all be naval, and of these the most important

were the enemy's foreign bases and centres of intelligence. Long experience had shown that until such positions were in our hands the task of clearing the seas of hostile commerce destroyers must be precarious and indefinitely prolonged. The governing principle, therefore, on which the Committee set out, was that all operations were to be regarded primarily as designed for the defence of our maritime communications, and not for territorial conquest. The single object was to deprive the enemy of his distant coaling and telegraphic stations."

Possible objective in Togoland. Amongst other possible objectives falling within the limitations laid down was the recently completed high-power German wireless station in Togoland, situated at Kamina, about 110 miles north of Lome. Able to communicate direct with Nauen near Berlin, with the German wireless stations in East Africa, South-West Africa, the Cameroons, Monrovia * (Liberia), and with any German ship in the Atlantic, it was the chief receiving and distributing centre for Africa and a pivotal point of naval communication.

Togoland. Togoland, with an area slightly larger than that of Ireland, and with a native population estimated at over a million, was enclosed on its three land sides by British or French territory. Until its annexation by the Germans in 1884, the majority of the tribes inhabiting the districts along or adjacent to the coast and adjoining the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast had regarded themselves as being under the suzerainty of Great Britain. But in 1885-86 both France and Great Britain signed agreements recognising German influence.

From the outset the Germans set themselves to develop thoroughly and systematically the country's natural resources, with the result that Togoland became the one German colony able to dispense with financial aid from the Fatherland. Their methods of administration, however, which replaced the native chief by the European official, and their system of education, which aimed at industrial rather than literary training, showed that they preferred German economic advantage to the country's social, intellectual, and political progress. It is true that there were no important chiefs in Togoland, but the jurisdiction of those there were was greatly restricted, while the German administrators were granted practically unlimited powers; and education, other than industrial, was left to

* At that period the three German-owned cables which ran from Monrovia to Pernambuco had not been interfered with by us.

the German missionary societies, whose main object was proselytism. Some of the German administrators had been brutal at times in their relations with the natives and frequently inhumane, while their generally rigid methods, including attempts to Teutonise the people by regulation, had been as unsuitable as they were unavailing. The unpopularity of German control, which had shown itself for some years past in a steady emigration to the Gold Coast, was confirmed by the attitude and behaviour of the Togoland natives after the outbreak of war in 1914.

A range of mountains, rising in places to heights of over 3,000 feet, traverses the country from south-west to north-east, and, dividing it into two approximately equal parts, formed a real barrier to traffic. Owing to this, the northern half of Togoland had not been developed to the same extent as the southern. Here there were three metre-gauge railways and several good roads. One railway ran along the coast from Anekho to Lome, another from Lome to Atakpame, and the third from Lome to Palime. The roads from Lome to Sokode via Atakpame, from Lome to Kete Krachi via Palime, from Palime to Atakpame, and from Kete Krachi to Sansane Mangu were, in 1914, reported to be fit for motors.

The Anglo-German frontier, for more than half its length, was marked by the left bank of the Volta river and by one of its tributaries. But a strip of territory extending about eighty miles along the left bank of the Volta's lower reaches lay in the Gold Coast Colony, forming a pronounced salient in the frontier line. The military significance of this salient was, however, lessened by the lagoons, swamps, and roadless bush country which covered its surface. The Volta, whose channel was all British, was navigable by shallow-draught launches as far as Akuse and up to Yeji by canoes, though these had to be carried past the rapids at Kete Krachi, where the Germans had formed an important inland trading centre. In Togoland canoes could go up the Oti river as far as Sansane Mangu, but with this exception none of the other rivers in the area of the British operations in August 1914 was really navigable. Another noteworthy feature of the frontier line, where it adjoined our Northern Territories Protectorate, was its bisection of the country of the Dagomba and Mamprusi tribes, the whole of which, until the Germans invaded it in 1897, had been recognised by them and by us as neutral territory. Since then, comparisons drawn by its inhabitants between British and German control had generally

been favourable to us, and we understood that most of the tribesmen would welcome a re-union under our protection.

Togoland was without a harbour, and had no natural facilities for the construction of one. Even at Lome, where a pier had been built to facilitate landing, steamers had to lie some distance out and transfer passengers and cargo into surf boats.

To the east and south-east of the central mountain range—the area with which we here are mainly concerned—the country rises from the marshes and lagoons of the coastal area through an undulating plateau, which, till it nears the mountains, is seldom more than two or three hundred feet high. For the most part the surface was interspersed with belts of oil palms and scattered cultivated clearings, or was covered with virgin forest and—where this had been cleared or burnt by the natives—with high grass and thick scrub. Many of the numerous small rivers and streams which traverse the area disappear partially or entirely in the dry season, rendering parts of the country periodically uninhabitable for want of water, though after rain they are subject to floods which hamper or stop movement. The rainfall, which is at times heavy, is much greater in the mountain areas than towards the coast, where the month of August is practically rainless. The climate is tropical, and though the temperature seldom rises above 90° F. in the shade, its humidity makes it very trying. The country is no healthier than other parts of West Africa, where even with prudence and precautions it is almost impossible to escape one or other of the major or minor prevalent complaints, most of them water-borne or caused by insects and vermin. Even in peace times under normal conditions the physical and moral strain on Europeans necessitates frequent leave to a temperate climate.

The total number of German native troops and armed police was estimated as about 800, and the majority of the three hundred or so Germans resident in the country were believed to have undergone a military training.

The Gold Coast. The Gold Coast, i.e., the colony of that name, Ashanti, and the Northern Territories, covered an area of rather over twice the size of Togoland. Composed of a number of small, self-contained and independent tribal states, its native inhabitants were prosperous and thoroughly contented with their unity under the British Crown, whose power and jurisdiction had indeed been accepted voluntarily by most of them. Like Togoland, the Gold Coast was enclosed on three sides by foreign territory, that on the north and west consisting of the French

possessions of the Upper Senegal and Niger and the Ivory Coast. It had no harbours, and landing, effected generally in surf boats, was difficult and at times dangerous. Except for the Volta, its two or three other partly navigable rivers were of practically no military importance; and until comparatively recent years before the war its roads consisted mainly of tortuous bush paths frequently blocked by fallen trees or swollen streams. The thick forest, heavy rains, lack of skilled labour, and scarcity of material for metalling made road and railway construction and maintenance both expensive and laborious. So that in 1914 there were only about 700 miles of road fit for light motor traffic; and besides the railway line from Sekondi to Kumasi, there was only a branch line from Tarkwa to Prestea, and a short railway from Accra to Koforidua. The alignment of these railways and of the motor roads had been determined mainly by commercial considerations, a drawback from the military point of view, since movement was restricted by the thick forest to the roads or paths practically everywhere but in the Northern Territories; and there for three-quarters of the year the high grass had the same effect. Moreover, the frequency of fly-transmitted disease prohibited the use of animals for transport purposes.

In Equatorial Africa there are practically always twelve hours of daylight, and as the seasonal variation of the hours of sunrise and sunset is slight, they may be taken for the purposes of this history as having always been about 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. respectively.

The only regular troops were the Gold Coast Regiment of the West African Frontier Force. This was composed of a battery, armed with four 2.95-inch Q.F. mountain guns, and of one pioneer and seven infantry companies, armed with short magazine Lee-Enfield rifles and with a machine gun for each company. There were also in charge of the regiment three .303 Colt automatic guns and a number of obsolete muzzle-loading 7-pounder guns distributed to various posts. Each of the infantry and pioneer companies was about 160 rifles strong; and the total establishment of the regiment was 38 British officers, 11 British warrant or non-commissioned officers, and 1,584 native ranks, including 124 carriers for guns and machine guns. There were also about 330 reservists. Raised in 1865 for service in Lagos and composed of 300 Hausas, it was transferred in 1873 for service in the Ashanti war to the Gold Coast, where it was reorganised and increased in strength by Captain Glover, R.N., and Mr. Goldsworthy. In 1879 it was

The Gold Coast Regiment, W.A.F.F.

constituted as the Gold Coast Constabulary, receiving its present title in 1901, when it was formed in two battalions. The Gold Coast Regiment had an excellent record, and its personnel had shown themselves to be possessed of fine fighting qualities in several local military expeditions. In 1914 the ranks of its single remaining battalion were filled with Hausas, Fulanis, Yorubas, and men from the Northern Territories. In peace time it was administered by the local Government, subject to the control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, whose military adviser was the Inspector-General of the West African Frontier Force. When on active service it came under the Army Act, and, like all other units of the West African Frontier Force, was liable to serve beyond the territory to which it belonged.

The Northern Territories Constabulary. There was also a semi-military native permanent force termed the Northern Territories Constabulary, which had been formed in 1907 from a nucleus of the then disbanded second battalion of the Gold Coast Regiment. In 1914 it had an establishment of 2 British officers and 321 native ranks, recruited in the Northern Territories, who were armed with Martini-Enfield carbines, a 7-pounder gun, and three machine guns.

Volunteer Corps. The four Volunteer Corps (the Gold Coast Volunteers, the Gold Coast Railway Volunteers, the Gold Coast Mines Volunteers, and the Ashanti Mines Volunteers) had between them a total strength of about 900, and were armed with rifles or carbines, four of the 7-pounder guns, and four machine guns. They could be called out on active service in the event of danger of invasion or rebellion, but were not liable to employment outside the Colony and Ashanti.

Police and Preventive Service. There were, further, about 800 civil police and 400 men of the Customs Preventive Service, who had received, as recruits, a semi-military training and who fired an annual musketry course. Most of them were armed with carbines.

Lack of military administrative services. In one important particular the organisation of the local force departed from normal methods. The duties which, in a military force, are carried out by its own administrative services were, in the Gold Coast, and in all the other British colonies and protectorates in West Africa, performed by civilians in addition to their civil duties. For instance, there were no supply officers, as a money allowance took the place of rations in kind to the native rank and file, who made their own private arrangements for obtaining and cooking their food; transport was provided for civilian and soldier alike by



REGIMENTAL SERGEANT-MAJOR ALHAJI GRUNSHI D.C.M., M.M.,
GOLD COAST REGIMENT, R.W.A.F.F.

On the 12th August 1914, near Togblekove he fired the first shot in the Togoland campaign and apparently the first rifle shot fired by any soldier of the British Army in the Great War.



GOLD COAST TROOPS

two civil transport officers and a few clerks; the personnel of the West African Medical Staff were in medical charge of both civilians and soldiers; and arms, ammunition, and military equipment generally were sent out from England direct to corps by the Crown Agents for the Colonies.

This arrangement provided economically and satisfactorily enough for the normal duty of maintaining internal security. But for operations against a foreign enemy it had several drawbacks. It meant rapid improvisation of staffs who, with all possible goodwill, were not always competent to carry out efficiently the engineer, communication, supply, transport, medical, and ordnance work which a force requires in the field. Moreover, as the civilian staffs were not maintained on a scale to allow for such a contingency, their withdrawal from their normal duties put a considerable strain on those who remained, and, at the same time, might afford a great opportunity to agitators and bad characters generally to create internal strife. The disadvantages of the system were well illustrated by our experiences in 1914-16. Sir Hugh Clifford, when he returned from leave at the end of August 1914 to resume the governorship of the Gold Coast, reported that the administration of its civil departments had been completely disorganised by the defence measures. At that time, it may be noted, there were no less than 73 British and 32 African civil officials from the Gold Coast employed with the columns in Togoland. It was fortunate for us—and a striking tribute to the success of the British administration—that we had a contented native population to deal with, whose goodwill and support we were always able to count on, in spite of straitened conditions, economic depression, and hostile rumours.

The defence scheme, which took into account the special local conditions, was based on the assumptions that, so long as the British navy retained the general command of the sea, any oversea attack would probably take the form of a hasty raid, and that the German forces in Togoland would hardly be capable of offensive action. If, however, they did take such action, they would probably in the first instance try to surprise Keta, Ada, and Yeji, so as to secure the navigation of the Volta, isolate the Northern Territories, and allow of a subsequent advance against Accra, Tamale, and Kumasi. To meet these possibilities, our own dispositions were to be made with a view to precluding espionage, protecting Accra and Tamale, guarding our lines of communication, preventing the isolation of the Northern Territories and safeguarding important coast

Gold Coast
Defence
Scheme.

towns. They included a line of observation along the coast and the land frontier, and the formation of small columns at Gambaga, Jimle, Salaga, Krachi, and Ada, with a reserve at Kumasi. Projects of attack, only to be undertaken under conditions already mentioned, were also outlined. These contemplated, in the first phase, a combined movement by the columns at Gambaga, Jimle, and Salaga to cause a German evacuation of Northern Togo, followed by a further advance to drive the German forces southward from the Sokode-Bassari district, and by an attack, if opportunity offered, on Lome by the Ada Column, reinforced by at least 300 men from a neighbouring British colony, and combined with an oversea attack. The Defence Scheme had, however, not been revised since March 1913, when the German wireless station at Kamina was still only in course of construction. Its completion in June 1914 naturally altered the situation.

The scheme laid down the main action to be taken, and in some cases the detailed orders to be issued, by the civil and military authorities, at the precautionary stage and on declaration of war respectively. In case of war the Officer Commanding the Gold Coast Regiment became automatically the Officer Commanding the Field Force, while the officers appointed to command at the different coast towns remained directly under the orders of the Governor.

Generally speaking, at the precautionary stage, which was adopted on receipt of a telegram by the Governor from the Colonial Office, action was taken:—to obtain information regarding enemy dispositions and intentions; for the Constabulary and the Preventive Service to watch the coast and patrol the frontier as well as the navigable part of the Volta river; to mobilise reservists and to increase as far as possible the numbers of the Volunteers; to replace certain military guards by constabulary or police; and to make all necessary preparations for the concentration, on declaration of war, of the troops at their war stations. In nearly all this action civil officials were directly concerned, and a brief outline of the duties allotted to some of them at the precautionary stage is specially relevant. The Principal Medical Officer had to make medical arrangements, including the allotment of personnel, for the columns in the field and the different garrisons; the Transport Officer, assuming the post of Supply and Transport Officer on the staff of the Officer Commanding the Field Force, had to buy up large quantities of food locally, arrange for further periodical supplies, and make preliminary arrange-

ments for the large number of carriers that would be required; * individuals had to be detailed as political officers to accompany each column; the Comptroller of Customs had to arrange for men to watch the coast and the frontier; the Postmaster-General had, in addition to other duties connected with the war, to make preparations to carry out the telegraph and telephone work the soldiers might require; and the Secretary for Native Affairs had to prepare letters, to be sent to the head chiefs of the tribes on the frontier on the declaration of war, notifying them of its causes and existence and directing them not to assist the enemy or give him information, and to communicate immediately to the nearest British official any information regarding the enemy which they might themselves receive or be able to obtain. The only actual military movements to be made at this stage, if Germany was the probable enemy, were:—one company Gold Coast Regiment with a 2.95" gun and ten pioneers from Kumasi by rail and sea to Accra, so as to be ready with the company already there to form the Ada Column; a half-company from Kumasi to reinforce Sekondi; and a detachment by forced marches to watch the frontier at Krachi.

On the 3rd August General Dobell in London drew up a brief appreciation dealing with the employment of the West African Frontier Force in the event of war. The only objectives which seemed to him worthy of attack were Lome and Kamina in Togoland and Duala, Buea and Victoria in the Cameroons. In Togoland the total German force was estimated as being 500–800 strong, ill-armed, and not too well trained. It had just been reported from the Gold Coast that the European reservists had been withdrawn from Lome and had embarked in a steamer to return to Germany,† and also that the Togoland constabulary were abandoning the frontier posts and were concentrating at Kamina and Aneko. The latter concentration seemed to General Dobell to point at anxiety regarding a French attack from Dahomey, though it was just possible that a German evacuation of Togoland and a withdrawal to Duala in the Cameroons was contemplated.

Lome, situated within two miles of the Anglo-German frontier, could, continued General Dobell, be approached by the coast road from Ada via Keta. For the greater part of

* It was estimated in the Defence Scheme that a total of 33 "captains," 138 headmen and 3,292 carriers would be required for a defensive rôle only.

† Another report said that this and other German steamers in the vicinity had been ordered to remain at Duala in the Cameroons.

General
Dobell's
appreciation;
3rd August
1914.

its length, however, this road was practically a causeway between the sea and the Keta lagoon, a serious obstacle at that time of the year; and since the roadless nature of the country rendered impracticable an advance through the area to the north of the lagoon, it might be difficult, without naval co-operation, to overcome the hostile resistance on this very narrow frontage which an enemy force could offer. All things considered, however, it appeared to General Dobell that an advance on Lome from Ada held out a reasonable prospect of success.

Alluding to the project for an attack on Lome outlined in the Defence Scheme, he then proceeded to suggest an alteration in the dispositions which it laid down. He considered that in the circumstances it would be permissible to cancel the proposed despatch of troops from Kumasi to Jimle, Salaga, and Krachi, and, instead, to send two companies of infantry, two 2.95" mountain guns and two machine guns from Kumasi to Ada. With the force already detailed by the Scheme for Ada, this would give a total there of four companies of infantry (640 rifles), three 2.95" guns, and four machine guns. French co-operation from Dahomey would probably be forthcoming if desired, and, even if the British navy were unable to assist, General Dobell came to the conclusion that the project offered sufficient hopes of success to warrant its being undertaken.

On the same day (3rd August) General Dobell discussed the conclusions he had arrived at with the General Staff at the War Office and with the Secretary of the Oversea Defence Committee, with the result that it was decided to include in the "War" telegram—when and if it was despatched—instructions to the Governor of the Gold Coast that those units of the Gold Coast Regiment detailed in the Defence Scheme to move to Jimle, Salaga, and Krachi should instead be held in readiness at Kumasi.

At its meeting on the 5th August the Offensive Sub-Committee recommended that, if the local military and naval situation permitted, the British forces in the Gold Coast, reinforced if possible from Sierra Leone, should be used for offensive purposes against Togoland with a view to destroying the wireless telegraph stations in that colony. If H.M. Government approved of the proposed operations, the details would require further consideration.*

* General Dobell's views and the Committee's recommendations regarding the Cameroons will be dealt with in the next chapter.

It is necessary now to turn for a time to the action that had been taken in the Gold Coast, where Mr. W. C. F. Robertson was acting Governor in place of Sir Hugh Clifford, at home on leave, and Captain F. C. Bryant, R.A., was acting Commandant of the Gold Coast Regiment, in place of Lieutenant-Colonel R. A. de B. Rose, also at home on leave. The telegram from the Colonial Office saying "Adopt precautionary stage defence scheme; powers not yet designated," was received at Accra at 11 p.m. on the 29th July by Mr. Robertson, who despatched the consequent telegrams to Captain Bryant at Kumasi and to others concerned as soon as the telegraph offices opened on the morning of the 30th. That day, a meeting was held at Accra of the Executive Council to discuss the action necessary, and all the preliminary measures there and at out-stations were taken without delay "in so far as this was possible," says Mr. Robertson in his despatch of the 12th August 1914, "with the reticence which the situation demanded." On the 1st August, as local supplies of provisions and petrol seemed likely to be restricted, Mr. Robertson appointed a civil committee to go into the question, the arrangements they recommended for taking over necessary stores and for controlling their sale being approved three days later by the Executive Council.

By the 31st July the mobilisation of the Gold Coast Regiment and its reservists had been completed, and Captain Bryant had come to certain decisions regarding the further military action to be taken, having regard to the existing circumstances and the latest intelligence of German movements and intentions. Good and accurate information regarding the German wireless station at Kamina had recently been acquired by the Intelligence Staff at Kumasi, and Captain Bryant was thoroughly alive to the importance of as rapid action as possible to capture or destroy it. Since the European officials, from the acting Governor downwards, and many prominent business men also appreciated fully the urgency of such action, he found himself exceptionally well situated in the matter of the support and assistance he would require. As already remarked, an offensive, with Kamina as its main objective, had not yet been legislated for in the Defence Scheme, and its dispositions were consequently obsolete. But Captain Bryant, coming to much the same conclusion as General Dobell in London was to arrive at two or three days later, decided that the concentration of columns at Jimle and Salaga was unsuitable; and he proceeded to arrange for a small column at Krachi, a column

The Gold Coast ;
29th July-
5th August
1914.

of two companies at Ada, and his main force at Kumasi, held ready to move to either of these two points as circumstances might dictate.

On the 30th or 31st July he accordingly ordered the following movements:—

- Half "A" Company from Kumasi to Krachi by forced marches,
- Half "A" Company from Obo to Kumasi,
- "B" Company from Zouaragou to Gambaga,
- "C" Company and one 2.95" gun from Kumasi to Ada via Sekondi and Accra,
- Half "D" Company from Sunyani to Kumasi,
- "F" Company (returning on relief from Zouaragou to Kumasi) to halt temporarily at Salaga,
- "G" Company from Cape Coast and Accra to Ada, and
- "I" Company from Kintampo to Kumasi.

For the concentration of the column at Ada the s.s. *Obuassi* was sent by the civil authorities on the 2nd August to Sekondi. Having embarked here "C" Company and the gun from Kumasi, this steamer, picking up "G" Company at Cape Coast and Accra, proceeded to Ada, where the whole column disembarked on the 5th August. In the meantime, late on the 2nd August, orders from London to establish censorship had been received at Accra and immediately given effect to; by the 3rd all the necessary proclamations, orders of H.M. The King in Council, etc., had been set up in type ready for issue; and by the 4th, from a much larger number of applicants, as many Europeans as could be armed and equipped had been enrolled in the existing Volunteer Corps.

On the morning of the 5th August came the telegram from the Colonial Office announcing the declaration of war, some hours after the news had been learnt by the interception of a German message from Berlin to Kamina.* Meetings of the Executive and Legislative Councils on the 5th made the further necessary arrangements,† while a reference to Captain

* Intercepted by a small wireless receiving set installed at Accra by the Postmaster-General. From the 30th July to the 25th August a continuous and close watch was kept here to catch interceptions by Messrs. L. C. C. Miles and E. Edginton, the only two British officials available for the duty. The twelve hours' daily duty which this meant for each of them imposed an intense strain, aggravated by the trying climate and endured by a devotion that deserves our admiration.

† Among the proclamations issued was one which endeavoured to secure the German missionaries from rough treatment by drawing attention to the past services in the Colony of the Basel Mission.

Bryant showed that the modifications in the Defence Scheme now ordered from London were practically those which he had already carried out. Then, on the same day, Mr. Robertson informed the Colonial Office by telegram that, in addition to two companies and a section of 2.95" guns already available at Kumasi, a further two companies would arrive there by the 14th. These with the column at Ada would give a total of six companies and three guns available for service outside the Colony by the 15th. Thus, thanks to the promptitude of Mr. Robertson, the initiative of Captain Bryant, and the active and ready support they received on every side, all the arrangements for war were by the evening of the 5th exceptionally well advanced.

Captain Bryant recommended that martial law should be proclaimed in the Gold Coast. But Mr. Robertson considered that this would have unpleasant results, and would be likely to be misunderstood by the native population; and as the Executive Council agreed with him, he decided against such action. Events justified his decision completely, as the attitude of the population proved it to be unnecessary. In fact, their spontaneous expressions of loyalty and offers of active assistance were numerous and so enthusiastic as to be at times embarrassing. Captain Bryant further suggested that native levies should be raised. But Mr. Robertson, considering that to do so might bring about inter-tribal collisions, declined to sanction the proposal in the absence of any news that the Germans were raising such levies.* Several of the chiefs were ready and anxious to assist in this way, the action of the Fia of the Awuna people in the Keta district being a typical example. In addition to sending out spies to obtain information of the German dispositions and having men ready to enter Togoland to cut the German telegraph lines, he offered to deliver a night attack on Lome with his men, of whom he had 12,000, and more if necessary, ready to give us armed assistance.

On the 5th August Mr. Robertson received the following telegram from Major von Doering, the acting Governor of Togoland. "As I understand from home, war has broken out between Great Britain and the German Empire. Having

* There was a long record of comparatively recent warfare between Ashantis and other races and of inter-tribal strife among these other races. There consequently still existed a latent feeling of inter-tribal hostility and jealousy, which any attempt to raise levies was calculated to revive, making the danger of collisions almost inevitable.

regard to insecurity of native tribes it is in interests of Togoland and Gold Coast to omit warlike enterprises likely to have no bearing on decision arrived at in Europe. Propose further remain neutral. Should be glad to receive an early reply." Mr. Robertson at once replied that he could not answer without instructions from London, which he had asked for. With reference to this German request, it is noteworthy that many people in England seem to have gathered the impression from Articles X and XI of the Berlin Act of 1885 (which provided that the protectorates of East Africa and Zanzibar might be placed under the rule of neutrality during a war) that the African dependencies would be declared neutral during a European war. So far as Great Britain, however, was concerned, discussion by the Colonial Defence Committee in the past had always resulted in a conclusion that such action would not be desirable. In this instance, the attitude of the German Government, who ordered Major von Doering to make the proposal, was clearly due to their desire to gain security for the Kamina wireless station.

Mr. Robertson's telegram requesting instructions on the German proposal was received in London between 5 and 6 p.m. on the 5th, at about the time that General Dobell was drawing up his project for an attack on Kamina, and some hours before receipt of the telegram saying that six companies of the Gold Coast Regiment would be available by the 15th.

Dobell's appreciation of 5th August 1914. General Dobell based his project on the force which he then estimated as available, i.e., 640 infantry (four companies), three 2.95" guns and four machine guns of the Gold Coast Regiment, and 315 infantry (two companies) and two machine guns of the Sierra Leone Battalion. The Sierra Leone detachment, he remarked, could only be moved by sea from Freetown under a naval escort, which might subsequently assist in the attack on Lome.

According to the latest information, he continued, the total German force consisted of about 150 Europeans trained to arms and some 1,000 indifferently armed native soldiers and police, of whom about half were said to be well trained. It was not known if they possessed any artillery.

He considered that the difficulties of intercommunication in a strange country and of supplies would render hazardous, if not impossible, any attempt to attack Kamina by columns converging on it from the west. Consequently Lome should be the first objective; and for the advance on this place he estimated that the concentration at Ada of troops from Kumasi

and Freetown would take six or seven days. From Ada, he continued, a portion of the force should move in boats along the Keta lagoon so as to outflank any hostile force encountered.

Supplies were said to be short at Accra, and food would have to be carried for the Sierra Leone troops who were rice-eaters, so that supply difficulties would probably be encountered.

After the capture of Lome, the force would possibly be able to utilise the railway to some extent in the advance on Kamina. But before this could be undertaken it might be necessary to attack the German force reported near Anekho, and also to form an advanced base of supply at Lome.

The provision of the necessary carriers would probably present difficulties, and on the assumption that two companies of infantry and one gun would be required to garrison Lome, General Dobell estimated that at least 1,000 carriers would be required.

On the 6th August, the Cabinet in London decided that the Togoland proposal of neutrality could not be entertained,* and, having approved of the project against Kamina, the Offensive Sub-Committee agreed that the War Office should work out in detail, in consultation with General Dobell, a scheme for the proposed operations, including details of the composition of the force and the sea transport required. As these operations would have to depend on the naval situation, the Admiralty should be informed as soon as possible of the date when the force would be ready to start. As it turned out, however, little further action in London was required.

At 6.40 p.m. a telegram was received at the Colonial Office from Mr. Robertson, saying that information had been received that the Germans had mounted three guns at Lome and had mined the landing stage and the principal buildings there; † and at 8.25 p.m. a further telegram arrived, in which Mr. Robertson said that he had learnt by accident that, without informing him, Captain Bryant had instructed the Officer Commanding at Ada to proceed under a flag of truce to Lome to demand the surrender of Togoland. Mr. Robertson asked whether Captain Bryant was to be given a free hand in forward movements. To this a reply was sent at 10.45 p.m. that pending further instructions a forward movement could not be sanctioned.

* The telegram acquainting Mr. Robertson with this decision was sent off at 3.40 p.m. on the 6th.

† This information proved to be incorrect.

Operations
against
Togoland;
6th August.

It appears that Captain Bryant, who had learnt that the French authorities in Dahomey and to the north were anxious and ready to co-operate with us in an offensive into Togoland, decided to clear up the situation by ascertaining the German attitude. He accordingly sent telegraphic orders at 9 a.m. on the 6th to Captain Barker, commanding at Ada, to proceed personally to Lome under a flag of truce and present a demand for surrender to the Governor of Togoland. Captain Barker was to point out that, as we had three strong British columns ready to cross the German western frontier, the French had three columns ready to cross their eastern and northern frontiers, and two important Togoland chiefs were ready to rise and assist us, resistance by the Germans was useless. The German Governor was to be given twenty-four hours within which to reply.

By constant observation the British Preventive Service had by this time learnt that the Germans were concentrating at Lome the men from their frontier posts and patrols, that they were mobilising reservists, impressing prisoners into the ranks, and calling on chiefs for levies. On the 5th August hundreds of refugees crossed the frontier from the Lome district, and, though temporarily stopped by the Germans closing the frontier during the night of the 5th/6th, continued for the next two or three days to come over in great numbers.

Mr. H. S. Newlands, District Commissioner of Keta, who had been appointed Political Officer to the Ada column, and who spoke German fluently, was to accompany Captain Barker to demand the German surrender. Meeting one another between Ada and Keta, the two officers, travelling partly by bicycle and partly by Ford lorry, reached Lome at 6 p.m. on the 6th. As they approached, a mounted patrol of Germans met them and conducted them to the Governor's quarters, where Major von Doering soon appeared, accompanied by Captain Pfaeler, the police * commandant, and Mr. Clausnitzer, the District Commissioner. After hearing Captain Barker read out the British ultimatum, and after the three Germans had retired into another room to confer, a discussion ensued. It having been agreed that the Germans were to be given twenty-four hours for consideration, during which time neither side was to move troops towards the frontier in an

* After their surrender the Germans laid stress on the fact that they had only police in Togoland and no soldiers. As, however, the training, arms, and equipment of the police varied little, if at all, from that of native troops in other German colonies, the difference was one mainly of nomenclature.

area south of an east and west line through Akuse, Captain Barker and Mr. Newlands took their departure. But they were almost immediately recalled and asked to confirm this definition of the area within which troops were not to be moved. This was done, and when they left again, at 7 p.m., Captain Barker said that he would return for the German reply at the same hour next day. Neither Captain Barker nor Mr. Newlands had understood why this request for confirmation had been made, but Major von Doering explained it three weeks later to Mr. Newlands. He had been staggered by the discovery, as soon as the two British officers had left the first time, that the line through Akuse ran *south* of Togoland. Having, however, received reports that the British had concentrated 1,000 men opposite Noepe, and that there was a British cruiser off Accra, he jumped to the conclusion that he was being given a hint to evacuate Lome to save it from bombardment. In reality Captain Barker, without a map and knowing that Akuse was sixty miles up the Volta, had defined the area on the spur of the moment, and neither he nor Mr. Newlands realised the mistake. They both arrived back at Keta at 9 p.m., where they remained till next evening.

In describing the journey, Mr. Newlands says that the sight presented that day by the streams of natives along the Lome-Keta road was unforgettable. Thousands of men, women, and children, all carrying their household goods, were fleeing from the probable scene of fighting which would, they were convinced, put an end to German rule.

On the morning of the 7th August there was intercepted at ^{7th August.} Accra a wireless message in clear German * to Berlin to the effect that the Governor of Togoland was leaving Lome next day with the troops to defend Kamina, and that the District Commissioner of Lome would surrender that place if the enemy pressed. In telegraphing this information to the Colonial Office, where it was received early in the same afternoon, Mr. Robertson said that he gathered that Captain Bryant contemplated action. A few hours later the Colonial Office replied that two companies and two guns were to move from Kumasi to Ada by the quickest land route, and that if Lome surrendered it was to be occupied at once and a base established there for a subsequent advance on Kamina. If Lome did not surrender, Captain Bryant was to use his

* The probable reason why it was not sent in cipher is that Major von Doering wished us to know that he was taking the hint which he imagined we had given him.

discretion as to awaiting reinforcements from Kumasi before moving forward, but he was not to advance on Kamina without further reference to London.

From Keta, on the morning of the 7th, Captain Barker sent orders to his troops at Ada to cross the Volta at 7 p.m. and march on Lome. By midday Mr. Newlands had received confirmation of the German evacuation of Lome, and also information that their troops were concentrating on Kamina. Learning this, Captain Bryant telegraphed to Mr. Robertson that the news regarding the evacuation of Lome had been confirmed, and he protested strongly against the restriction on a forward movement imposed by the Colonial Office telegram of the 6th. He said that if operations were to be controlled from London, it would be impossible for him to carry out what he considered essential, and he consequently claimed freedom of action. He was of opinion that if Captain Barker received an unsatisfactory reply at Lome, its immediate occupation and an advance on Kamina by a strong column were imperative.

Captain Barker and Mr. Newlands, in the Ford lorry driven by a Krooboy and accompanied only by Mr. Newlands' police orderly, returned to Lome at 7 p.m., and were met by Mr. Clausnitzer. Major von Doering had left with the troops, but had delegated full powers to Mr. Clausnitzer to surrender Lome and the coast-line to Anekho with territory extending for 120 kilometres inland (i.e., as far as Khra village). The Germans, said Mr. Clausnitzer, being outnumbered, desired to save from a bombardment the open and unfortified town of Lome, to which they intended to return in six months' time. But they would resist the Allies if they attempted to penetrate inland. About a hundred Germans remained at Lome, consisting according to him only of missionaries and others not liable for military service, women, and children. The telegraph cable at Lome had been cut, and the telegraph instruments there destroyed by the Germans before their evacuation.

Captain Barker's telegram reporting the above reached Mr. Robertson about midnight on the 7th/8th, when he also received the Colonial Office instructions for the occupation of Lome.

8th August. At an early hour on the 8th * Mr. Robertson telegraphed to the Colonial Office that, having heard from the Governor of Dahomey that the French, whose troops had on the 7th

* The telegram was received in London at about 8 a.m.

occupied points near Anekho and on the river Mono, proposed co-operation with us to occupy Lome and South Togoland, he had instructed Captain Bryant to place himself in communication with the Governor of Dahomey.

French accounts show that on the 4th August the Governor of Dahomey had also received a proposal of neutrality from Major von Doering, but, treating the message as merely an official notification of a state of war, had forwarded it to the French Governor-General at Dakar without vouchsafing a reply, and had at once taken action to restrain Germans residing in Dahomey and to start the invasion of Togoland. As the attitude of Great Britain was then still uncertain, co-operation from the Gold Coast could not be counted on; and preparations were made to carry out the prearranged plan of seizing the Togoland coast and Lome so as to deprive the Germans of support from the sea. This plan, it is said, had been drawn up in ignorance of the existence of the German wireless station at Kamina, which, being only sixty kilometres from the French frontier, would otherwise have been made the objective of a sudden advance. On the 3rd August the Germans had been reported by the French Intelligence as having concentrated a party of Preventive guards opposite Agoué, but by the next day these men were said to have dispersed again to their ordinary posts. On the 5th the French heard that a German military detachment had arrived at Anekho and had destroyed two important bridges there, and that there was a noticeable movement of German troops towards Lome. Information was also received that there was little enthusiasm among the German native troops. On the 6th it was reported that all the roads leading westward from the Mono were held by German detachments of a sufficient strength to delay a French advance, and that behind these detachments there was a general troop movement towards Atakpame. This change in the German dispositions was evidently due to British entry into the war.

On the evening of the 6th August French police occupied the German Customs posts near Athieme, and on the 7th Major Maroix, commanding the troops in Dahomey, ordered the capture of the frontier post at Agbanake, which was probably strongly held, and the occupation of Anekho, which the Germans were said to have evacuated. Agbanake was occupied at 7 p.m. on the 7th, and a detachment under Captain Marchand entered Anekho at 4 a.m. on the 8th, in both cases without opposition. The French were welcomed by the local

natives, who, on the previous evening, had shown their feelings by setting fire to the German Government House at Sebe. A French railway detachment started to repair the Anekho-Lome railway, and the French advance, still unopposed, continued, Porto Seguro being occupied at noon on the 8th and Togo at 5 p.m., while the advanced guard pushed on further towards Lome. This advance was stopped, however, when it was learnt that Lome had been surrendered to the British. During the next two or three days the French force consolidated its position by the occupation of important posts on the Mono river up to Tokpli and to the northward of Anekho.

8th August. To Mr. Robertson's telegram of the 8th August regarding French co-operation the Colonial Office at once replied, directing him to ascertain if they would also co-operate in an attack on Kamina and with what strength. If they agreed, the Colonial Office wished to know whether Captain Bryant considered that, after the arrival of the reinforcements from Kumasi, he would be able to undertake offensive action with the British and French troops without waiting for further reinforcements from another colony. At 11.20 p.m. the same day the Colonial Office received an answer from Mr. Robertson saying that the French agreed to co-operate. They had 250 rifles and a railway section about Anekho and the Mono, another 250 rifles and a section of artillery at Savalou and other posts in Dahomey, and they were arranging for reservists to garrison posts in Togoland. Captain Bryant, added Mr. Robertson, was of opinion that he could undertake the offensive without waiting for outside reinforcements.

In the meantime, a proposal by Captain Bryant to move the Kumasi reinforcements from Sekondi to Keta by sea, so as to save the fortnight it would take them to march, had been approved by the authorities in London, subject to local information indicating no undue risk. Thereupon Mr. Robertson arranged for the s.s. *Elele* to proceed from Accra to Sekondi to carry them.

8th-9th August. Lome. Captain Barker and Mr. Newlands spent the night of the 7th/8th August in a German bungalow at Lome. Early on the 8th a Gold Coast telegraph operator arrived there by bicycle from Keta, with an instrument on his back, and with the aid of German native linesmen succeeded, despite the chaos of wrecked instruments in the post office, in opening communication with Keta and Accra. The services of a small party of fourteen Gold Coast soldiers and police, who happened to be

at the frontier post of Aflao, were requisitioned that morning by Mr. Newlands to assist in confirming the British occupation. The Union Jack was hoisted on the Secretariat; all Germans remaining in the town were ordered to hand over their arms; proclamations declaring martial law, etc., were printed and posted up; and the services of some friendly natives were procured to patrol the outskirts of the town. The unsupported situation of the two British officers was, however, precarious, and Captain Barker sent urgent telegrams to Keta to accelerate the arrival of his troops. But, in addition to crossing the four miles or so of the Volta river, these men had to cover fifty-one miles on foot; and by the evening none had arrived. A few men of the Gold Coast Preventive Service were then sent from Aflao to Lome, and some more friendly natives were procured to patrol outside the quarters of the British officers, who passed an anxious night, feeling that they might have to beat a retreat at any moment.

At 9 a.m. on the 9th the leading detachment, about thirty rifles strong, of the column from Ada reached Lome, and was followed by the remainder, in successive parties, during the next twenty-four hours.* Their rapid march of over fifty miles in fifty hours had, however, exhausted them greatly, and it was some time before Captain Barker was able to take adequate steps to occupy and secure the town and its vicinity. Fortunately the attitude of the Germans there was courteous and even cordial.

Lome town, with a normal population of about 200 Europeans and 8,000 natives, was well laid out, with a hospital, many Government buildings, and Government railway and other workshops. Dr. Le Fanu, who arrived with the Ada column, took over the hospital, which, with accommodation for 21 Europeans and 60 natives, was well equipped; and he also retained the services on payment of its German nurses and native establishment. The sanitary arrangements, however, had been neglected since the German departure, and the sudden influx of the British detachment with its large number of carriers and other native followers aggravated the bad conditions that had already set in.

During the day a party of civilians, sent off by Mr. Robertson by sea from Accra the previous day, also arrived. Among

* The passage of the Volta had been facilitated by the ready and energetic assistance of Captain Fellowes, the Manager of the Volta River Transport Company, and for the march the Awunas assisted greatly by the provision of carriers and of food and water for the troops.

them were Major J. J. F. O'Shaughnessy, telegraph engineer, with half a dozen European and native telegraph operators with telegraph material, Dr. O'Hara May, and a railway engineer with a small party of workmen.

Major O'Shaughnessy at once, in accordance with instructions he had received, picked up, cut, and sealed the German cable between Monrovia and Duala; within twelve hours he had the railway and cranes on the pier working ready for disembarkation work; and he had also started work in the railway and other workshops. Dr. O'Hara May also took prompt and energetic measures to restore and expand the sanitary measures necessary to cope with the abnormal strain of increased numbers.

9th August. At 11 a.m. on the 9th August the Colonial Office telegraphed to Mr. Robertson that he was to instruct Captain Bryant to move, in co-operation with the French commander, against Kamina with the object of capturing the wireless station. Captain Bryant would be in chief command of the Allied force with a temporary higher rank. The same morning Mr. Robertson received a telegram from the Governor of Dahomey saying that a French detachment repairing the railway at Porto Seguro was in touch with Captain Barker, and inquiring whether the French force available—8 French officers, 20 French non-commissioned officers, and 450 Senegalese with two mountain guns—would be sufficient. To this, after consulting Captain Bryant, Mr. Robertson replied in the affirmative, and gave the French Governor particulars of the strength and disposition of the Gold Coast forces. Mr. Robertson also said that he was in communication with the Governor-General of French West Africa in regard to combined operations in North Togoland by British forces from the Northern Territories Protectorate and by French forces from Upper Senegal and Niger.

10th August. On receiving sanction for the movement of the Kumasi detachment by sea, Captain Bryant had started to make the necessary arrangements, and with these he made such good progress that his headquarters (Captain C. G. Hornby, adjutant of the regiment, as staff officer, and Lieutenant J. V. Earle, Intelligence Officer), two companies ("I" and "Pioneers"), a section 2.95" guns and 800 carriers, with his civilian medical, supply, and transport staffs, had all embarked at Sekondi in the *Elele* by 4 p.m. on the 10th, twenty-four hours earlier than he had anticipated. The excellent work carried out at Sekondi since the 30th July by Mr. R. E. P.

Gibson, the acting Chief Transport Officer of the Colony, had facilitated this rapid movement and embarkation.

Receiving the Colonial Office instructions to move against Kamina before he left Kumasi, Captain Bryant had issued orders for the concentration of three companies at Krachi under command of Captain P. E. L. Elgee for an advance towards Kamina by land, preparations for which, in anticipation of such instructions, he had already made.

Kete Krachi had already been occupied by a British detachment. Captain O. H. Warne, an Assistant District Commissioner, while touring his district, had received news from the District Commissioner of Yeji of the possibility of war; and, after making arrangements to facilitate the movement of troops to British Krachi, had started to go there himself by forced marches. On the 4th August, when about ninety miles short of Krachi, he met half "A" Company Gold Coast Regiment (30 rifles) under a British colour-sergeant on their way there, and, pushing on ahead with five of this detachment, he reached British Krachi on the evening of the 7th. At the customs post here there was a small detachment of Preventive men and police, and he learnt that at Kete Krachi there were three Germans and about forty of their native troops. He decided that the situation justified him in stopping all traffic across the ferry, and he posted sentries and took other steps to this end. Early next morning news of the declaration of war reached him from Yeji, and he at once crossed the river with a white flag to demand the surrender of the German post, to find, however, that the enemy troops had retired during the night, abandoning much ammunition and many stores. He at once took possession of the German post, where he was shortly joined by the rest of "A" half-company; and, after sending back word of what had occurred to the Chief Commissioner of Ashanti and to Captain Bryant, he employed himself till Captain Elgee's arrival on the 16th in patrolling the vicinity and gathering information.

11th August. The *Elele* sailed after dark on the 10th August with lights out from Sekondi to Accra, where she remained during the 11th, and where Captain Bryant landed and discussed arrangements with Mr. Robertson. While they were together, telegrams arrived from the French Governors of the Ivory Coast and Dahomey, with the information that 500 "auxiliary cavalry" with 50 to 60 *gardes cercles* were due to reach Sansane Mangu between the 13th and 15th from Upper Senegal and Niger. This force would guard the district against attack,

Occupation
of Kete
Krachi.

and a company of *tirailleurs*, about 180 strong, was being sent in support and to prepare for a forward movement in co-operation with the British.

At Accra a contingent of civilians joined Captain Bryant—medical officers, railway officials and personnel, fifty police under a Deputy Commissioner,* members of the Public Works Department, and also several volunteers for work in various capacities. The organisation of the base at Lome and of the onward communications could only be made possible by such means, and Mr. Robertson's readiness to assist was carried to the utmost limits. For instance, on learning that Captain Bryant desired Major O'Shaughnessy to accompany the troops in their advance, he at once lent the services of Mr. S. B. Gosling, the Postmaster-General, to organise telegraphic and telephonic communication at the base. Here, as Captain Bryant reported in his final despatch, his work contributed very largely to the success of the expedition.

12th August.

Leaving Accra after dark on the 11th in a dense fog, the *Elele* reached Lome early next morning. Disembarkation commenced at 8 a.m., and thanks to the previous arrangements made by Major O'Shaughnessy and the disembarkation work of Captains R. Minto and Yardley,† all the personnel were ashore by 10 a.m. and all stores by 4 p.m. During the day arrangements with the French were agreed upon for a converging and co-ordinated advance against the enemy in the Atakpame-Kamina area by Colonel Bryant's column reinforced by the French force from Anekho, by a French column under Major Maroix advancing via Cheti, and by Captain Elgee's column from Krachi. The Allied forces in Northern Togoland, acting under orders from Major Maroix, would also move southward.

The total British strength at Lome was now as follows:—

Gold Coast Regiment :	British officers, 16	} with three 2.95" mountain guns and 4 machine guns.
	British N.C.Os., 7	
	Native ranks, 535	

<i>Attached to the force :</i>	British civil officials or volunteers	34
	Native police	50
	Native carriers and labourers	2,000

* Mrs. Bettington, the wife of this Deputy Commissioner, volunteering for nursing duties, also went to Lome a day or two afterwards.

† Captain Minto was Messrs. Elder Dempster & Co.'s agent at Sekondi who had accompanied Captain Bryant, and Captain Yardley commanded the *Elele*.

During the 12th and 13th August Captain Bryant, who was given the temporary rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, was occupied in organising and preparing for an advance and in gaining information of the country and the enemy's intentions and dispositions. Among the staff appointments made the following may be mentioned: Mr. H. S. Newlands as Political Officer; Major S. B. Gosling as Director of Army Signals and Railways, with Major O'Shaughnessy as his Deputy; Dr. W. W. Claridge as Senior Medical Officer; Captain E. C. Spencer as Supply and Transport Officer; and Captain D. R. A. Bettington as Base Commandant. In gaining information and in enabling Mr. Newlands to get into touch with the local chiefs, the Fia of the Awunas was of material assistance.

12th-13th August at Lome.

On landing at Lome, Colonel Bryant learnt that on the 11th the railway bridge and small wireless station at Togblekove, about ten miles to the north, had been destroyed by an enemy party who had come south by train. To prevent further damage, he at once detached a half-company of infantry, reinforcing it on the 13th with a further company and a half.

The advance on Kamina commenced on the morning of the 14th August, "I" Company of the Gold Coast Regiment under Captain H. B. Potter forming the advanced guard and pushing forward from Togblekove. The main body moved in two columns along the road and railway respectively. The road, however, allowed to fall into disrepair since the construction of the railway, was no longer passable for wheeled traffic, and attempts by Colonel Bryant's force to use motor lorries* along it had to be abandoned, though subsequently it was found possible to use light motor-vans obtained from the Gold Coast. Road and railway ran parallel to one another, in some places close together, but in others separated by a considerable distance, the intervening country being swampy and covered with dense high grass or thick scrub. As inter-communication between the two columns was, therefore, generally difficult and frequently impossible, mutual co-operation was much hampered.

14th August. The advance from Lome.

* These lorries had been hastily collected along the coast by the prize steamer *Marina*, manned by a scratch crew from the Gold Coast under a District Commissioner—Mr. Heathcote, who had been a lieutenant-commander in the navy—his only European assistants being two schoolmasters without qualifications for the task. As Commander Heathcote was the only man on board who knew anything of navigation, the steamer had many narrow escapes from disaster.

By the evening "I" Company had reached Tsevie without opposition, advanced patrols under Mr. R. S. Rattray * had reported all country south of Agbeluvoe to be clear of the enemy, and the main body had concentrated at Togblekove. At 10 p.m. "I" Company started to advance by road to Agbeluvoe.

15th August. The main body, leaving a section of infantry at Togblekove, moved forward from there at 6 a.m. on the 15th August. About two and a half hours later, on reaching a point about half a mile south of Dawie, Colonel Bryant learnt from some local natives that a train full of enemy troops had come into Tsevie about 6 a.m. and had opened a heavy fire on the railway station.† On reaching Tsevie, however, Colonel Bryant found that the enemy had, at about 8 a.m., retired in his train moving northward. No communication from "I" Company had been received since the previous night, and Colonel Bryant, being anxious to support it, pushed on at once with all speed.

Affair of Agbeluvoe; 15th-16th August. In the meantime, at about 4 a.m., "I" Company, halted on the road near Ekuni, had heard this train pass on its way south. Captain Potter at once detached Lieutenant H. S. Collins with a section to try to cut it off, while he himself with the remainder of the company pushed on as fast as possible to Agbeluvoe. Reaching the railway by a bush track shown them by a local Hausa, Lieutenant Collins's section piled up a barrier of stones across the line about 200 yards north of the Ekuni bridge, and took up a position of readiness there while Lieutenant Collins and Mr. R. W. Kilby ‡ visited the bridge. These two officers, managing to take up a heavy loose iron plate, laid it across the line, and then Lieutenant Collins brought his section down to take up a concealed position in the bush by the bridge. They had not been there long when a second German train from the north stopped at the barrier of stones, but retired before Lieutenant Collins's men, who at once advanced to the assault, could reach it. Meanwhile, Captain Potter's party, who had heard this train pass, had taken up a position to intercept it. But, though they riddled the engine with bullets till it spouted steam in all directions, the train ran through them at full speed.


Captain Potter, who was soon afterwards rejoined by

* Of the Gold Coast Civil Service, attached to the Intelligence Staff.

† It appears that the only British troops in Tsevie at this hour were four men of "I" Company rejoining from escort duty.

‡ Of the Gold Coast Survey, attached Intelligence Staff.

To face p. 29]



WRECKED GERMAN TRAIN NEAR EKUNI

Lieutenant Collins's section, then proceeded by road to Agbeluvoe station, where he took up a defensive position across railway and road (here about eighty yards apart) against attack from both north and south. Both the German trains were still south of Agbeluvoe, and, for the last two hours of their march, the escort to "I" Company carriers, who were some way behind the company, had to defend themselves and their convoy against continuous German attacks, their safe arrival in the afternoon at Agbeluvoe station being largely due to the courage and leadership of their commander, Colour-Sergeant Gethin. At an early hour of the evening the enemy in force attacked the British position from the south, but were beaten off; and further attacks they made during the night met with no better success. Early on the 16th the news of Colonel Bryant's advance caused the enemy to retire hastily on his train, where after some further fighting he surrendered to Captain Potter. This gallant and skilful British defence—for which Colonel Bryant in his despatch attributed the greatest credit to Captain Potter, his officers, and men—had completely foiled the enemy attempts to break through, and contributed considerably to his final downfall.

At about 3 p.m. on the 15th Colonel Bryant's advanced guard on the railway had encountered, near the Lili river, enemy troops who, as the British approached, blew up the bridge and took up a defensive position on a ridge behind it. Here, mainly owing to the thick and difficult nature of the country, they succeeded in delaying the British advance till 4.30 p.m., when they were forced to retire, leaving one European and two native dead behind them. This delay obliged Colonel Bryant to give up his intention of joining "I" Company that evening; and his troops, who had sustained four casualties,* did not reach Ekuni—where they found twenty railway vehicles which had been derailed by the obstruction on the bridge—till 5.30 p.m. Trouble and discomfort were experienced that night by the British force, through a stampede at dusk, caused by the fire of a few enemy stragglers, of the whole of its seven hundred carriers, whose dispersion or alarm was so great that in some cases they did not come into Ekuni till 10 a.m. next day.

At 7 a.m. on the 16th August two German prisoners—one, Baron Codelli von Fahnenfeldt, the designer of the Kamina wireless station, and the other the enemy's explosive expert—

* One native killed, one European and two natives wounded.

were brought into Ekuni. None of the messengers sent by Captain Potter had managed to get through, and Colonel Bryant, who was consequently still without news of "I" Company, now started again towards Agbeluvœ. No enemy troops were encountered till about half-way there, and even then the opposition they offered was not great, while the arms and equipment of all sorts they had abandoned along the road indicated their demoralisation. As the British approached Agbeluvœ, sounds of heavy firing were heard till Colonel Bryant's force arrived within a mile of the station, when they found that most of the enemy who had come south in the two trains had surrendered. It was subsequently estimated that the enemy's numbers had been at least 200, and Captain Potter had taken prisoner 16 Europeans, who with others previously captured or killed accounted for 25 of the 30 believed to have been with the force. The material captured included two engines, railway vehicles, a machine gun, many arms, and much ammunition. As Colonel Bryant pointed out in his despatch, the moral effect of this German disaster proved to be very great. One of its most important immediate results was that, thanks to the demoralisation of the flying remnant of the enemy, no attempts were made to destroy the railway for thirty miles north of Agbeluvœ, which thus fell intact into British hands.

The British casualties had totalled 6 native ranks killed, including 4 of the Preventive service, and 35 native ranks wounded, including 30 carriers. From the marked contrast between the wounds suffered by the British force and those inflicted by our own ammunition it was evident that the enemy was making extensive use of soft-nosed bullets, and Colonel Bryant protested formally in writing on the 18th August to Major von Doering. This appeared to have little effect, for the nature of the wounds sustained by our men continued throughout the operations to be so destructive that it was found necessary to send urgently for more medical personnel from the Gold Coast. A subsequent expert examination in England of ammunition taken from the German force showed that that used for their machine guns and by their regular native troops could not be regarded as outside the limitations imposed by the Hague Convention, but that many of their European ranks and their levies had been using ammunition which this Convention forbade.*

* For Major von Doering's own explanation, see his letter of 25th August, 1914, to Lt.-Colonel Bryant in Appendix I., p. 430.

From an account of the operations written at Kumasi in September 1914 by a German reservist sergeant-major, then a prisoner of war, it appears that the German force at Agbeluvœ consisted of two native companies under the command of Captain Pfaeler. He says that during the attempt to break through Captain Potter's force at night the native troops would not follow their German leaders and, becoming quite demoralised, fired wildly in all directions, endangering the Germans in front of them. Six Germans were killed, including Captain Pfaeler; and the death of this officer, who was the real German commander, appears to have had a considerable moral and material effect both then and subsequently. As the fleeing remnants of the two companies made no attempt apparently to communicate with Kamina, the first news of this disaster reached there from a German engine-driver, whose train had come under fire from Agbeluvœ.

On the 15th August Colonel Bryant, learning that the Germans were compulsorily enrolling native levies and arming them with Mauser rifles, urged Mr. Robertson to enlist levies among the Ashantis and Awunas in the Gold Coast. But he replied that, if further assistance were required, he preferred to ask for detachments of the W.A.F.F. from Sierra Leone and Lagos. The growing needs of his line of communication also obliged Colonel Bryant to apply to Mr. Robertson for the services of more police to guard the line, of more carriers, and of additional transport, railway, and telegraph officers. But the Gold Coast had already furnished all the assistance it could, and Mr. Robertson replied suggesting that Colonel Bryant should use men of the Preventive Service to guard the line.* Even in the matter of material he was unable to fulfil all Colonel Bryant's requirements. At this stage the Fia of the Awunas, in agreement with the Base Commandant at Lome, whom he was personally assisting, started to raise 2,000 levies from his people to guard the railway line, and both he and they evinced great disappointment when told that their services would not be required. On the 17th August, when the inability of the Gold Coast to comply with Colonel Bryant's requests was learnt, instructions were telegraphed from London to Sierra Leone to send two companies W.A.F.F. to Lome; and when a reply from there showed that it would take a few days to make the necessary shipping

British
reinforce-
ments.

* Two detachments of Gold Coast Preventive Service men, one under Mr. A. J. Beckley and the other under Supervisor Thompson, had moved to Lome, and were acting as police guards there and at Togblekove.

arrangements, Nigeria was requested on the 21st to despatch a similar detachment by the quickest route, sending on one company independently at once if available. This company, it may be noted, reached Lome early on the 24th, but, as it happened, neither it nor the two companies from Sierra Leone, which arrived three days later, were required.

Events in
Northern
Togoland.

In Northern Togoland, British and French detachments of troops, police, and irregulars had occupied Yendi and Sansane Mangu respectively, without opposition, on the 14th August; and further Allied detachments, in communication with one another, were moving to confirm and follow up this success. Nearly half of the 400 German native troops in the area had deserted, and the remainder had rapidly retired, while many, if not most, of the local chiefs were offering allegiance to one or other of the Allies. The occupation of Sansane Mangu had been effected by M. Duranthon, who had advanced by forced marches from Fada Ngurma with a small force of 40 police and about 100 irregulars. He was followed by M. Arboussier with a force from Wagadugu of a few police and about 120 irregulars, and by Captain Bouchez with a detachment of 130 rifles of the 2nd Senegalese Tirailleurs. M. Arboussier, it may be noted, arrived at Sansane Mangu on the 23rd and Captain Bouchez, whose detachment covered over 600 kilometres (372 miles) in twenty days, on the 26th August. A British column of details, 104 strong (including 42 Northern Territories Constabulary), from Gambaga, under Lieutenant C.C. Grattan-Bellew, also joined the French at Sansane Mangu on the 18th. Other French detachments of police and irregulars, of a total strength of about 400, also at this time occupied other points in Northern Togoland. The movements of the French forces, though meeting with little or no opposition, were carried out under most trying climatic conditions through a very difficult and little known country.

In the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast, two detachments of the Constabulary, each 20 strong, under Lieutenant W. F. R. Kyngdon,* had been despatched from Tamale on the 4th and 5th August to Zan on the Eastern frontier. But Captain C. H. Armitage, the Chief Commissioner of the Northern Territories, heard with some dismay on the night of the 10th that the officer commanding a company of the Gold Coast Regiment, ordered by Captain Bryant to move to

* This officer, who was an artillery officer employed in the Survey Department, had been detailed as Intelligence Officer to the Jimle Column.

Krachi, had, through a misunderstanding, ordered Lieutenant Kyngdon's detachment to leave Zan and accompany him to Krachi. Captain Armitage feared a raid on Tamale, which had been denuded of constabulary, by a German force, 250 strong, which was reported to have left Sansane Mangu in a southerly direction for an unknown destination; and he had also learnt that the German Commissioner was still in residence at Yendi, though ready to leave if our troops crossed the frontier, and that the Na of Yendi and his people were eagerly awaiting our arrival. Captain Armitage at once sent orders to Lieutenant Kyngdon to return to Zan, and at the same time instructed Major J. Marlow, commandant of the Constabulary, to take all the available trained men at Tamale to Zan and to occupy Yendi if he received favourable reports from our native spies. Major Marlow, with eight N.C.Os. and men, left Tamale on the 12th and occupied Yendi without opposition on the 14th. It appears that the German Commissioner, learning from his spies of the movement of Lieutenant Kyngdon's men on the 11th, had left Yendi on the 12th. Captain Armitage himself followed a few days later, and met with a most gratifying reception from the Na of Yendi and many chiefs, who expressed a wish for the reunion of the Dagomba nation under the British flag. Other small detachments of the Northern Territories Constabulary also entered Northern Togoland at this period, the total number employed in the war area amounting to 139. Further to the south, Messrs. Saich and Cooke of the Gold Coast Service, crossing the frontier with 46 men of the Preventive Service, occupied Ho unopposed on the 17th.

To rest his troops, organise his line of communication, and refit from Lome with ammunition and stores, Colonel Bryant found it necessary to halt at Agbeluvoe till the 19th August. Early on the 17th strong officers' patrols left to secure the important railway bridge over the Haho river, seven miles to the north; and as they sent in reports that the enemy was advancing in strength, "G" Company was despatched that afternoon to join them. They were further reinforced next day by a French Senegalese detachment under Captain Castaing, consisting of 3 French officers, 5 French non-commissioned officers, and 150 men, who had just arrived from Anekho. On the 18th also, Adakakpe, four miles north of the Haho bridge, was occupied by half "C" Company.

To cover the flank of his main line of communication, Colonel Bryant issued orders on the 17th for the detachments

of Preventive Service men under Messrs. Beckley and Saich at Lome and Ho respectively to move towards Palime. On the same day Mr. A. J. Beckley proceeded from Lome by motor-cycle, accompanied by a Preventive superintendent, and on the 18th cut the Palime railway line at a point about thirty miles from Lome. The Germans were still occupying Palime, but soon afterwards retired and abandoned the railway after destroying the road and railway bridges near Agu.

By this time, thanks to the efficient and untiring efforts of the railway personnel from the Gold Coast, the bridge at Togblekove had been repaired, and on the 18th railhead was brought up to the Lili river. The telegraph personnel, whose work was equally praiseworthy, had also restored the line as far as Agbeluvoo.

19th August. Colonel Bryant resumed his advance on the 19th August, when his advanced troops occupied Nuatya. That day he notified Major Maroix, commanding the French column at Cheti, and Captain Elgee, commanding the Krachi Column, that he intended to be on the Amuchu river on the 26th, and he requested them both to be within two days' march of Kamina by that date.

These messages, which Colonel Bryant despatched across country by native runners, were successfully delivered in time, a result which he attributed to the universal dislike of the Germans by the natives of Togoland.* Towards the British, on the other hand, their attitude was consistently amicable and helpful. Though in some cases they had been coerced, under penalty of instant death, to take up arms against us, they took every opportunity to evade such action, to obstruct the Germans and to assist us, while the welcome they extended to Colonel Bryant and his men at every stage of the British advance was most marked and obviously sincere. As a typical instance, Colonel Bryant relates how one old chief came out to meet him bearing a Union Jack which he had kept hidden since 1884.

The French column under Major Maroix consisted of 23 French and 345 Senegalese (including reservists) with a section of guns. Concentrating at Cheti on the 19th August, it started to advance against Kamina on the 22nd.

The Krachi Column under Captain Elgee consisted of "A,"

* The message to Captain Elgee was actually, it appears, stopped by Germans at Agu on the Lome-Palime railway till Mr. Beckley arrived there and took it on.

"B," and "F" Companies of the Gold Coast Regiment, which all reached Krachi between the 16th and 18th August. Crossing the Volta in canoes collected by the Preventive Service, the column left Kete Krachi on the 19th and advanced down the Kpandu road.*

Colonel Bryant's advanced troops occupied Kpedome and his main body concentrated at Nuatya on the 20th August, both continuing northwards on the 21st. On that day, officers' patrols under Captain A. F. Redfern † reported that the enemy was holding a very strong entrenched position at Khra village, about five hundred yards northward of the railway bridge over the Khra river. This bridge and two mines on the railway line were blown up in the faces of these patrols, and they also came under a heavy fire from two German machine guns. But, being well and boldly handled, the Allied scouts succeeded in gaining sufficient information of the enemy dispositions to enable Colonel Bryant to frame a general plan of attack.

Khra village, which stood immediately west of the railway and extended across the road, consisted of an irregular oval enclosure about 400 yards from south-east to north-west and some 150 yards wide. The Germans had dug trenches close to and round this enclosure, as well as some joining and to the eastward of a railway cutting by the village; and they had emplaced three or four machine guns on their flanks, so as to cover all approaches from the dense surrounding bush.

This denseness of the bush accentuated the difficulties of an attack. The direction the attackers must take could at first only be indicated in general terms, and they would not find it easy to maintain it correctly; owing to the difficulty of inter-communication and inter-observation, neighbouring units could not expect to arrange mutual support with one another; and the guns, whose utility was in any case limited by the amount of ammunition they were able to transport on their carriers, would be unlikely to obtain positions from which to range and observe. Moreover, once committed to the attack, units would soon be out of sight of the Force commander, and could only remain in touch with him and one another by messenger.‡ In fact, a co-ordinated advance would be im-

* The staff of the column included Captain P. J. Mackesy and Lieutenant Kyngdon as Staff and Intelligence Officers, Mr. L. H. Wheatley as Political Officer, and Dr. W. G. Watt as Senior Medical Officer.

† Assistant Commissioner of Police in the Gold Coast.

‡ The companies had no telephone equipment.

practicable, and success would depend mainly on the initiative and individual action of subordinate commanders.

Affair of
Khra :
22nd August. Colonel Bryant planned his attack accordingly. On the morning of the 22nd August his force, covered by an advanced screen, moved forward in two columns. On the right, on the railway, were the Pioneer and half "G" Companies of the Gold Coast Regiment and Captain Castaing's detachment of Senegalese. The Pioneer Company was to hold the enemy in front while the remainder of the column turned the enemy's left flank. The column on the road was composed of half "C" Company, "I" Company, and the three guns of the Gold Coast Regiment, and here, while half "C" Company held the enemy in front, "I" Company was to find a way round the enemy's right flank. The guns were to give such support as they could.

As the half of "G" Company under Lieutenant G. M. Thompson only consisted of twenty-two rifles, seventeen Senegalese were placed under his orders by Captain Castaing. This combined party, leading the advance against the enemy's left, worked their way round through the bush till, at about 11 a.m., they were checked by a heavy rifle and machine gun fire from well-constructed trenches on the German flank. Here they held their ground till about 3.30 p.m., when, as it appeared to Lieutenant Thompson that the enemy's fire was slackening as a result of the British gun fire, he led his men to the assault, well supported by Captain Castaing with the remainder of the Senegalese. But the enemy machine guns had not been really affected; and, in spite of the great gallantry they displayed, the attackers were brought to a standstill at fifty yards' distance from the enemy's trenches, Lieutenant Thompson, the French Lieutenant Guillemart, and many native ranks having been killed or wounded. Further progress being impossible, the attackers retired. The devoted bravery of the seventeen Senegalese under Lieutenant Thompson's orders is specially worthy of mention. All but one of them were killed or wounded, and the position in which, after the fight was over, the bodies of their twelve dead were found showed that to the last they had stood by the British officer whose safety had, they felt, been entrusted to them; and here it was held most fitting to bury them in graves round that of Lieutenant Thompson.

On the left "I" Company had managed, under heavy fire, to work their way right round the enemy's right, but only to find further trenches which it was impossible to assault

without further support. Accordingly at nightfall they withdrew and entrenched themselves in the river bed some three hundred yards westward of the village. Two of the British guns under Lieutenant W. L. St. Clair had come into action, in spite of hostile machine gun fire, and had opened fire at a range of 1,300 yards, which "I" Company had sent back word as being the probable distance. But the effect of their fire was unknown at the time, though it was subsequently learnt that their first shell had gone through a high tree, which the enemy then gave up using for observation purposes.

Out of a strength of about 450 combatants actually engaged, the Allies had suffered 75 casualties.* The three enemy machine guns, well concealed and skilfully handled by German ranks, had fired many thousands of rounds and had contributed largely to the successful defence. Their effect on the men of the W.A.F.F., who were facing machine gun fire for the first time, had been distinctly demoralising, and had called for the highest qualities of leadership on the part of their British commanders. Moreover, the old pattern British machine guns, though well handled, had not been nearly so effective.

During the night Colonel Bryant made all arrangements to renew the attack at daybreak on the 23rd. On his own right he entrenched so as to contain the enemy opposite, and he reinforced "I" Company for an assault on the enemy's right. But next morning the German force, of an estimated strength of 60 Germans and 400 natives with three machine guns, was found to have retreated hastily. As the fight on the 22nd August appeared to Colonel Bryant to have gone equally well for both sides, this was quite unexpected; and he could only assume either that the Germans feared that their line of retirement would be cut on the 23rd, or that they had heard of the French advance from Cheti and had decided to concentrate for the defence of Kamina.

According to the German sergeant-major's account, their force of rather over two native companies had been in occupation of the Khra position, digging and camouflaging trenches and clearing the field of fire, for three days before the fight. At first the Germans, he says, feared the effect of the British gun-fire, but found that they were well able to hold their own;

* Killed :—1 British and 1 French officer and 21 native ranks (5 British and 16 French);
Wounded :—2 British officers, 1 French non-commissioned officer, 43 native ranks (23 British and 20 French) and 6 carriers.

though the sudden Allied assault against their left flank appeared dangerous for a time, and was only checked by the timely arrival of a third native company by train from Kamina. The order to retire was apparently unwelcome to many of the Germans, whose casualties had only been 13,* and who were by this time convinced of their ability to offer a prolonged resistance in this strong position.

23rd-24th August. Sending out officers' patrols to Gleï and the Amu river, where the Germans were said to have rallied, Colonel Bryant with the main body remained at Khra during the 23rd and 24th August, to organise for a further advance and to evacuate his wounded to Lome. The rapid repair of the railway and the improvisation of an ambulance train, both due to the excellent work of the railway officials from the Gold Coast, facilitated these arrangements and saved many lives.† In this connection, it is noteworthy that, apart from bullet wounds, there was very little sickness in the force, though all ranks had frequently to sleep all night in clothes which were wet through.

Though Colonel Bryant did not know it, owing to a storm interrupting telegraphic communication for nearly three days, interceptions at this period at Accra of German wireless messages showed that they had destroyed their cipher codes and that they evidently considered their situation to be desperate. In fact, Colonel Bryant's anticipation of a stubborn German defence of Kamina led him, in view of his own depleted numbers, to send orders to the Krachi Column to move at once via the Palime railway to Lome to reinforce him. The situation round Palime could, he felt, be dealt with adequately by the Preventive service detachments under Mr. Beckley.

25th-26th August. On the night of the 24th/25th loud explosions from the Kamina direction were heard at Khra, and in the morning the masts of the wireless station, which had been clearly visible from Gleï, were no longer discernible. By 10.30 a.m. Colonel Bryant had occupied Gleï with his main body, and his leading troops were on the Amu river, where the Germans had destroyed the road and railway bridges. At 4 p.m. two Germans (Major von

* 3 Germans, 10 natives.

† A few days later the German prisoners at Kamina, on being told to prepare to proceed to Lome by train, declined flatly to believe that the railway could have been repaired. The astonishment and incredulity they displayed affords a good testimony to the efficiency and work of the British railway engineers and their men.

Roeborn and an under-officer to interpret) came into Gleï under a flag of truce to submit terms of capitulation.* Colonel Bryant informed them in reply that any surrender must be unconditional, and that his force was advancing at once on Amuchu. This advance he at once started to carry into effect by occupying the north bank of the Amu river. The river, however, came down in flood that night, and it was not till midday on the 26th that the whole column had passed over by the footbridges which had to be constructed. Colonel Bryant himself reached Amuchu with part of his force at 10.30 a.m. on the 26th August, to be met by two German officers bearing a letter of unconditional surrender. German
surrender ;
26th August.

Mr. Newlands, who had recently rejoined Colonel Bryant from Lome, was sent that afternoon to Kamina to arrange the details of the ceremony of surrender on the following day. There he found that the great wireless station had been wrecked beyond repair. Its nine huge masts lay on the ground twisted and broken, and everything that was breakable, including the storage batteries and the 24-foot marble-faced switchboard, was in fragments. To complete the work, kerosene oil had been poured over all and ignited. All that remained of this most modern and powerful station was a smoking ruin.

Though the use of this station by the Allies would certainly have been an advantage, its loss to the enemy was infinitely more important. Without this direct means of communication, the German ships in the Southern Atlantic, if not elsewhere, would be completely out of touch with current events; and the results of our capture of Kamina must consequently be judged by subsequent naval events in that quarter.

Major Maroix's column from Cheti, after encountering some opposition on the 22nd and 23rd August and incurring a few casualties, also entered Kamina on the 27th. Over 200 Germans surrendered with 3 machine guns, over 1,000 rifles, and about 320,000 rounds of ammunition.

The Krachi Column, advancing via Ahenkro and Liati, reached Palime on the 23rd August, and on the 25th was joined when within thirty miles of Atakpame by Mr. Beckley, who brought the two messages from Colonel Bryant, one of the 19th and the other sent from Khra ordering Captain Elgee to proceed with his three companies to Lome to reinforce the main column. The Krachi Column had met with no opposition, though the area

* See Appendix I.

it traversed offered considerable natural facilities for a small force to oppose its advance ; and it had met with no other difficulties. The roads it traversed had been good, supplies had been easily obtained locally as it advanced, and the attitude of the natives had been very friendly.

The German
Force.

The Germans, whose force appears to have consisted of one German and seven or eight native companies, totalling about 300 Germans and 1,200 natives, had been expected to offer a much stouter resistance. The difficulties of the country were all in their favour, and it had never been anticipated that they would surrender without attempting to hold the elaborate network of trenches and dug-outs with which the Kamina station was surrounded.* But their Intelligence system broke down completely with the outbreak of war—they could get no news whatever from the Gold Coast, as no native would proceed there and return—and the only answer they could obtain from Berlin to repeated requests for instructions was an order to protect the wireless station. The rapid invasion of the country by the several Allied columns, whose numbers they invariably over-estimated, consequently combined with the lack of co-operation by their own native subjects † to place them at a grave disadvantage.

To the rapid Allied success several factors contributed. The initiative and skill of Colonel Bryant ; the able and energetic action of the local French civil and military authorities ; the courage and endurance of all ranks of the Allied forces ; and the ready and whole-hearted assistance rendered by civilians from the Gold Coast.‡ The whole operation in fact furnished an exceptional example of fine co-operative effort.

On the 28th August Sir Hugh Clifford reached Lome from England, and after personal discussion with the Governor of

* The German sergeant-major's account says that many of the Germans had little or no military training, and also that, though the Kamina position was well entrenched, it was too large for the available force, and was commanded on all sides by surrounding hills.

† Some of the natives, however, remained loyal to their German masters, as the following instance shows. The Germans, before their surrender, announced to their native police and employes generally that they were returning in six months' time. This was so far believed that about February 1915 several of these men came into Lome and asked why the Germans had not returned.

‡ Many names have necessarily been omitted, but Messrs. C. H. Harper (acting Colonial Secretary) and W. L. Townsend (Attorney-General) are specially mentioned by Mr. Robertson as deserving of much of the credit of achievement.


Dahomey, they both proposed that, pending the final post-war settlement, the western districts of Togoland should be administered by the British and the eastern by the French. This was approved.

From the outset the natives of Togoland showed themselves to be so well contented with the change of Governments that most of the Allied military force was soon able to withdraw from the country.

The Gold Coast, shortly afterwards, by the unanimous vote of its Legislative Council, voicing the widely manifested desire of its inhabitants to share the Imperial burden, expressed its desire to bear the whole financial cost of the British share of the operations. By this generous act it crowned fittingly the military achievement of the first capture in the war of a German colony, to which its own efforts had contributed so much.

TOGOLAND.

MAP 1



PREPARED IN THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
2047/31.

Ordnance Survey 1930.

